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The Impact of Dividend Reduction on Shareholders Wealth – Evidence 
from Australia 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the stock price reactions to interim and final dividend reductions 
in Australia. We find that the market reacts more negatively to interim dividend reductions 
than final dividend reductions consistent with the view that market participants anticipate 
deterioration in profitability of firms that eventually announce interim dividend reductions.  
We find that size of the dividend reduction depends on the riskiness of the firm (idiosyncratic 
risk), size of the firm prior year profitability and changes in the profitability.  We also find 
that reduce dividend at the interim level rather than delay to final stage depends on the prior 
year profitability and size of the firm.   
Key Words: Price reaction, Australia, Dividend Cuts, Omissions, interim and final.     
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The Impact of Dividend Reduction on Shareholders Wealth – Evidence 
from Australia 
 
 
 
1.0 Introduction  
 
 
The idea that changes in dividends convey information has existed for over five decades.  
Bhattacharya (1979), Ambarish et al. (1987), John and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock 
(1985) develop theoretical arguments for dividends as signalling mechanism of future firm 
value. Consistent with the notion that dividend changes are used as signalling device, 
empirical researchers have documented positive price reactions when firms increase 
dividends and negative reactions when they reduce dividends (see for example Aharony and 
Swary (1980)) 
 Of particular interest to our study is reduction in dividends and their impact on stock 
prices.  Dividend reductions have been studied by Ghosh and Woolridge (1988, 1989), 
Christie (1994), Sant and Cowan (1994), and others. Several recent papers find support for 
the interesting finding that dividend reductions are more informative than dividend increases 
(see for example, Jensen and Johnson (1995), Leftwich and Zmijewski (1991) and Michaely, 
Thaler and Wormack (1995).  
Based on our survey of the literature, we find it interesting to study dividend 
reductions and their impact on stock prices for these reasons:   
1.  There are no existing studies in the Australian context on dividend reductions and 
their impact on stock prices. 
2. Australia follows the dividend imputation policy as opposed to the traditional 
double taxation policy prevalent in countries such as the U.S.  
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3. Australian firms follow the policy of paying interim and final dividends. This 
custom is not practiced in countries such the U.S.  
Australian firms pay dividend twice a year (interim and final) consistent with UK (see 
for example Balachandran (2003): the first payment at mid-year referred to as the interim 
payment and the second and final payment commonly known as the final dividend.  Interim 
payments are much smaller on average than final payments. Balachandran (2003) argue that a 
dividend reduction at the interim stage would convey to the markets an unavoidable urgency 
to conserve cash and as a consequence, greater share price reactions would be observed at the 
interim stage than at the final stage and find support for this hypothesis. As such this paper 
investigates the impacts on prices of initial interim dividend reductions and initial final 
reductions for firms that did not reduce their dividends in the previous two-year period in 
Australia. In this paper, we also categorise dividend reductions into cuts and omissions to 
examine whether they have different stock price impacts.  
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the research design, while 
Section 3 presents the empirical results using standard event study methods and cross-
sectional regression analysis.  Finally, our conclusions are presented in Section 4. 
 
2.0 Research Methods  
  
2.1 Data and Sample Selection 
 
 Initial interim and final dividend reduction were identified for Australian companies, 
where there were no dividend reductions (either interim or final) during two-year period 
immediately preceding the initial interim and final reductions for the period between January 
1995 and December 2006 using the DataStream and IRESS databases. Dividend reduction is 
defined relative to the previous year's value, i.e. there is a reduction if the interim (final) 
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dividend per share this year is less than the interim (final) dividend per share paid last year.1 We 
find 269 dividend reductions 125 interim dividend reductions (75 cuts and 50 omissions) and 
144 final dividend reductions (110 cuts and 34 omissions).  We consider only initial dividend 
reductions since they are likely to elicit a stronger stock price reaction as opposed to 
subsequent reductions which may be anticipated.  
 Table 1, Panel A contains the distribution of our sample across the years classified by 
the following four categories dividend reduction:  Interim Cuts, Final Cuts, Interim 
Omissions, and Final Omissions.   We use the same categories in the rest of our analysis.  We 
notice that in general, the number of interim omissions in a given year exceeds the final 
omissions, while the number of final cuts usually outnumbers the number of interim cuts.    
Since omissions convey a sense of urgency in conserving future cash flows, there seems to 
exist a predilection to omit interim dividends in preference to final dividends.   On the other 
hand, cuts occur during periods of milder declines in profitability.  In general, the managers, 
therefore, tend to cut the final rather the interim dividends in order to avoid sending a 
stronger negative signal. 
 In Panel B of Table 1, we present our sample broken down by industry classification 
for each of the four categories of dividend reductions.  We find that two of the industry 
sectors, viz., Materials and Capital Goods account for over 30% of our sample of dividend 
reductions.  Diversified financials, Food, Beverage and Tobacco, Real Estate and Retailing 
together account for about 29% of the sample.  The other 41% is distributed across all other 
sectors.  
2.2  Firm Characteristics of Dividend Reducing Firms 
 In Table 2 Panel A we show some of the characteristics of our sample categorised on 
the basis of interim and final dividend reductions. We find that the prior year profitability as 
                                                 
1 After the adjustment for the capital changes. 
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measured by NPAT/TAt-1 is lower for the Interim Reductions as compared to the Final 
Reductions subsample.  The median current period profitability is also significantly lower for 
firms that reduce interim dividends as compared to final dividend reducing firms.  
Furthermore, the change in profitability as depicted by ∆NPAT/TA is significantly more 
negative for interim dividend reducers as compared to final dividend reducers.  Taken 
together, these variables indicate that firms which face lower profitability and steeper 
declines in profitability tend to prefer reductions in interim dividends rather than postpone the 
reductions to final stage.  Another interesting fact that emerges is that the market value of 
interim dividend reducers is significantly lower than that of final dividend reducers.   The 
book-to-market ratio at the balance sheet date immediately prior to the year of dividend 
reduction is higher for interim dividend reducers than that of final dividend reducers.  This 
finding implies that firms with higher growth opportunities (or lower tangible assets) tend to 
defer their dividend reductions to a future period. Finally, we find that interim dividend 
reducers have significantly higher idiosyncratic risk as compared to final dividend reducers.  
These findings denote that smaller and riskier prefer to conserve cash by choosing to go for 
interim reductions instead of deferring their reductions to the final dividends.  
 In Panel B of Table 2, we portray the firm characteristics of all four categories of 
dividend reducers.  Our data denote that interim cutters and omitters are smaller than final 
dividend cutters and omitters as measured by total assets and market value.  In general, 
omitters have lower profitability than cutters with interim omitters performing worse than 
final omitters.  Firms that face the worst declines in profitability choose to omit rather than 
cut their dividends.  Cutters – both interim and final – have lower idiosyncratic risk than 
omitters.  Interim cutters and omitters have higher idiosyncratic risk than final cutters and 
omitters respectively.   Summing up, these findings indicate that omitters face an urgency in 
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conserving cash due to their lower profitability and tend to be more vulnerable due to their 
smaller size and higher risk.          
 
2.3. Return generating processes and test statistics 
This study employs the market model (MM) to examine the daily abnormal returns 
around announcement dates. Model parameters were estimated using 200 observations, 
commencing 260 days prior to the event. The market model was used to estimate the 
abnormal returns, with an estimation period 260 days prior to the announcement day to 61 
days before the announcement day (day –260 to day –61). The market proxy used was the 
Australian All Ordinaries Share Index, which is a broadly based index comprising 
approximately the top 300 stocks ranked by market capitalization. This study uses the t-test 
statistic (standardized residual test statistic) to report the significance levels of the price 
reaction. The daily returns were measured using logarithm returns after the adjustment for 
dividends on ex-dates.  The abnormal returns for announcement periods were generated for 
different events windows: - day -2 to day 2 (two days before to two days after the 
announcement), day -1 to day 1 (the day before to the day after the announcement), and day 0 
to day 1.  These event windows were used to control for leakages and for "after hours" 
announcements (which are particularly likely for announcements of bad news).  
 
3.0 Price Reaction to Dividend Reductions 
3.1. Announcement effects 
In table 3, we report results regarding the stock price reaction to dividend reductions of 
Australian firms.  We report mean and median abnormal returns and the standard residual t-
tests (SRT) employing the market model for dividend reduction for the periods; the two day 
before the announcement date to two day after (day-2 to day +2); the day before the 
announcement date to day after (day-1 to day +1); the day before the announcement date (day 
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0 to day 1). Panel A represents price reaction to dividend reductions for all as well as interim 
and final dividend reductions. Panel B represents price reaction to interim cuts and final cuts. 
Panel C represents price reaction to interim omissions and final omissions.  
The results from Panel A of Table 3 indicate that the 5-day mean CAR surrounding the 
announcement of all reductions is a statistically significant -3.36%.  Interim dividends evoke 
a much stronger negative response of -4.75% as compared to -2.15% for final dividend 
reductions. Both results are statistically significant at the 1% level.  Results reported for other 
event windows to (-1, +1), (0,+1) provide similar results.   
Interim dividend reductions are seen as bad news while final dividend reductions are 
viewed less negatively. This implies that the market is able to infer deteriorating performance 
of firms that subsequently reduce interim dividends.  In the case of firms that reduce final 
dividends, the market holds a more benign view regarding future prospects.   
The results of Panel B show the price reaction to announcement of interim dividends 
cuts, interim dividend omissions, final dividends cuts and final dividend omissions. 
Omissions evoke much stronger negative response as compared to cuts. The 5-day 
surrounding announcement (-2,+2) averages -7.05% for interim omissions as compared to -
3.21% for interim cuts.  Similar results are found for (-1,+1) and (0,+1) windows.  Similarly 
for final omissions we observe stronger negative reaction as compared to final dividend cuts.  
Our results are consistent with the view that omissions indicate steeper deterioration in a 
firm’s future prospects while cuts follow moderate declines in a firm’s profitability.  
The 5-day (-2,+2 window) shows that interim omissions are accompanied by a strong 
reaction (-7.05%) compared to (-3.28%) for final omissions.  Results are robust to alternate 
window specifications such as (0,+1) and (-1,+1).  The results are consistent with the view 
that interim omissions convey more bad news as compared to final omissions.   Price reaction 
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results also indicate that market views interim dividend cuts as more negative compared to 
final dividend cuts.  Results are robust to alternate windows. 
 
3.2  Cross sectional Analysis 
A regression model is used to test the sensitivity of the results reported in section 3.1 after controlling 
the variables that may influence the price reaction. The dependent variable is the abnormal return 
from day -1 to day 1. The set of explanatory variables and their anticipated signs (in parenthesis) are 
outlined below. 
DRED (-)  is the percentage reduction in dividend (both interim and final).  
DIOF  (+) equals 1 if the firm reduces its dividend at the interim level and zero if 
the firm reduces the dividend at the final level. The rationale for the inclusion of 
this explanatory variable derives from the hypothesis that interim dividend 
reduction has strong information content. 
PRECAR  (-) is the cumulative abnormal return from day -60 to day -3. If the market 
anticipates a reduction, it will start bidding down prices prior to the 
announcement. The greater the bidding down prior to the announcement, the 
lesser the magnitude of the price reaction on the announcement date. There is 
also a possibility of leakage of information.   
LMV  (+) is the natural logarithm of the market value one calendar month prior to the 
dividend reduction. Eddy and Seifert (1988), Haw and Kim (1991) and Marsh 
(1993) find a negative relationship between company size and the extent of 
market reactions around the dividend announcement date.  
BM t-1   is the ratio of book value of total assets to market value of total assets. This is 
a control variable and is used as a proxy for the extent and quality of 
investment/growth opportunities. 
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Table 4 contains the results. The dividend reduction (DRED) variable has the expected 
sign and is statistically significant in all models. The dummy variable DIOF has the expected 
sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level.  It is consistent with the hypothesis that an 
interim dividend reduction provides a greater “shock” (Interim shock effect). The coefficient of 
BMt-1 is not significant.  PRECAR is negative and statistically significant as expected indicating 
that prior anticipation of bad news attenuates the price response at the announcement of 
dividend reductions LMV and Gearing ratiot-1 are not statistically significant.  
Summing up, the market reacts more negatively to dividend reductions when the 
percentage of cuts is larger, when interim rather than final dividends are reduced, and when 
reductions are anticipated (or leaked) prior to the actual announcements.      
 
4.0 Determinants of the level (percentage) of dividend reduction  
We conduct Tobit regressions using the percentage of dividend reduction as the dependent 
variable. The results are portrayed in Table 5.  In Panel A, we display results for the full 
sample.  As expected previous year’s profitability as measured by NPAT/TAt-1 has a negative 
coefficient, indicating that firms with lower prior year profitability tend to cut dividends more 
other things being equal.  The decline in current year profitability as compared to previous 
year, ΔNPAT/TA also has a negative sign indicating that firms facing a steeper decline in 
profitability tend to make deeper cuts in dividends.   Idiosyncratic risk has a positive and 
highly significant coefficient in the Tobit regressions. Firms with high idiosyncratic risk tend 
to make steeper cuts in dividends other things being equal.  Finally the coefficient of LMV 
(logarithm of the market value of the firm) is negative denoting that large firms tend to make 
less steeper cuts in dividends as compared to smaller firms ceteris paribus.     
   
 In Panel B of Table 5, we show the results for the sub-sample of interim dividend 
reductions.  As in the case of full sample NPAT/TAt-1 has a negative coefficient, indicating 
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that firms with lower prior year profitability tend to cut dividends more other things being 
equal.  ΔNPAT/TA is negative and significant but only at the 10% level.  Idiosyncratic risk 
has a positive and highly significant coefficient in the Tobit regressions. But the coefficient is 
smaller compared to the full sample.  Finally the coefficient of LMV (logarithm of the market 
value of the firm) is not significant.  In Panel C, we show the results for firms that reduce 
final dividends.  In general, the coefficients tend to larger in magnitude as compared to the 
interim dividend sub-sample. 
 Summing up, prior year profitability and decline inn current year profitability are the 
major determinants of the level of dividend reductions affirming the importance of 
profitablity in dividend reduction decisions.  Firms with higher risk and lower market 
capitalisation tend to cut dividends more steeply, implying that they are most vulnerable to 
downturns.  Cutting dividends somewhat steeply is likely to conserve their cash position and 
seems to be the preferred decision by managers.       
 
5.0 Decision to reduce dividend at the interim level than final 
 We next look at the determinants of the decision to cut the interim dividends versus 
final dividends.  Interim dividends will be cut when the firm is in dire straits.  The decision to 
hasten the cuts and reduce the interim dividends is more likely for financially vulnerable 
firms. Clearly prior year profitability should be one of the major determinants.  When the 
profitability has only declined mildly, managers tend to cut final rather than interim 
dividends.  The size of the firm is expected to also have a bearing on the decision.  Small 
firms are financially more vulnerable and when faced with profitability declines are more 
likely to reduce interim rather than final dividends to conserve cash.  In order to test these 
conjectures, we conduct probit regressions and report the results in Table 6.  Our conjectures 
regarding prior year profitability and size of the firm is supported in the probit regression 
 12
results reported in table 6 with statistically significantly negative coefficients for both firm 
size and prior year profitability.  We also use the book-to-market ratio (B/Mt-1) computed as 
of the prior year in our regressions.  B/Mt-1 denotes growth/investment opportunities.  Firms 
with low B/Mt-1 have high growth opportunities. It appears, from the regression, that B/Mt-1 
plays no significant role in the decision to cut Interim as opposed to Final dividends. 
 
6.0 Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the stock price reaction to dividend reductions of Australian 
firms during the period 1995-2006.  Dividend reductions are associated with negative stock 
price reaction.  The reaction is stronger for omissions as compared to cuts.  This is because 
firms cut dividends in response to moderate declines in profitability as opposed to omissions 
which are motivated by significant declines in future prospects.  Interim reductions produce 
stronger negative abnormal returns as compared to final dividend reductions.  We believe that 
firms cut or omit interim dividends only when they are in dire straits.  The immediacy of the 
dividend reductions is probably responsible for the stronger market reaction. Our study 
reinforces the view that interim dividend reductions contain a strong signalling element.   
We find that size of the dividend reduction depends on the riskiness of the firm 
(idiosyncratic risk), size of the firm prior year profitability and changes in the profitability.  
We also find that reduce dividend at the interim level rather than delay to final stage depends 
on the prior year profitability and size of the firm.   
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Table 1: Sample of Total Dividend Reductions 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A - Dividend Reduction Year By Year Analysis 
Year Interim Cuts Final Cuts Interim Omissions Final Omissions Total 
1995 3 5 1 0 9 
1996 12 12 1 2 27 
1997 4 7 0 3 14 
1998 3 7 3 1 14 
1999 10 11 5 2 28 
2000 4 14 1 2 21 
2001 10 8 9 9 36 
2002 7 6 6 3 22 
2003 6 10 8 5 29 
2004 2 6 5 2 15 
2005 6 9 5 2 22 
2006 8 15 6 3 32 
Total 75 110 50 34 269 
Panel B : Dividend Reductions industry by industry analysis 
Industry Interim 
Cuts 
Final 
Cuts 
Interim 
Omissions 
Final 
Omissions 
Total 
     Number % 
Automobiles & Components - 2510 3 5 1 0 9 3.35 
Banks - 4010 4 0 1 1 6 2.23 
Capital Goods- 2010  5 19 8 3 35 13.01 
Commercial Services & Supplies -2020 2 8 4 3 17 6.32 
Consumer Durables & Apparel - 2520 4 3 1 3 11 4.09 
Consumer Services - 2530 0 3 1 1 5 1.86 
Diversified Financials- 4020 5 10 3 1 19 7.06 
Energy – 1010 3 2 1 0 6 2.23 
Food & Staples Retailing -3010  2 2 0 1 5 1.86 
Food Beverage & Tobacco – 3020 4 12 5 3 24 8.92 
Health Care Equipment & Services – 3510 1 4 1 1 7 2.60 
Insurance -4030 3 2 1 0 6 2.23 
Materials- 1510 21 14 8 3 46 17.10 
Media -2540 2 5 2 1 10 3.72 
Oil &Gas 1010 1 0 0 0 1 0.37 
Industrial Conglomerates - 2015 0 0 1 0 1 0.37 
Real Estate - 4040 3 7 2 5 17 6.32 
Retailing- 2550 6 7 3 2 18 6.69 
Software & Services -4510 3 1 1 2 7 2.60 
Technology Hardware & Equipment- 4520  2 0 3 1 6 2.23 
Telecommunication Services – 5010 0 0 0 1 1 0.37 
Transportation -2030 1 3 4 1 9 3.35 
Utilities -2040 0 2 0 1 3 1.12 
Total 75 110 50 34 269 100.00 
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Table 2: Some Basic Univariate Tests 
This table provides univariate statistics on firm characteristics. Panel A reports univariate statistics on firm characteristics for 
total sample, interim reductions and final reductions. Panel B reports univariate statistics on firm characteristics for sub-
samples of interim cuts, final cuts, interim omissions and final omissions. This table also provides nonparametric Mann 
Whitney statistics for the difference in median between two sub groups: interim reductions and final reductions, and 
nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test statistics for the difference in median values across the four sub groups: interim cuts, final 
cuts, interim omissions and final omissions. 
Panel A – Total sample and Two Way classification: Interim reductions and Final reductions 
   
All 
Interim 
Reductions 
 
Final Reductions 
 
MW test 
Total Assets t-1 Mean    ($M) 1511.22 1404.56 1603.81  
 Median ($M) 105.19 92.44 112.23 1.33 
NPAT t-1 /TA t-1 Mean % 6.51 4.93 7.89  
 Median% 5.96 5.03 6.29 1.91* 
NPAT t /TA t Mean % 0.62 -1.33 2.32  
 Median% 3.40 2.41 3.81 2.82*** 
NOCF t-1/TA t-1 Mean % 7.73 7.55 7.88  
 Median% 7.59 6.75 7.80 0.43 
NOCF t/TA t Mean % 6.29 5.77 6.74  
 Median% 5.92 6.16 5.70 0.59 
∆NPAT/TA Mean % -5.89 -6.25 -5.58  
 Median% -2.53 -3.29 -2.15 2.03** 
∆NOCF/TA Mean % -1.44 -1.78 -1.14  
 Median% -1.40 -1.39 -1.43 0.19 
MV Mean  ($M) 910.54 682.08 1108.86  
 Median 80.16 54.69 105.18 2.26** 
BM t-1 Mean 0.89 0.92 0.86  
 Median 0.89 0.94 0.85 2.23** 
Idiosyncratic risk  Mean % 2.56 2.73 2.42  
 Median % 2.18 2.44 2.08 2.11** 
Sample Size  269 125 144  
Panel B – Four Way classification: Interim Cuts, Final Cuts, Interim Omissions and Final Omissions 
  Interim 
Cuts 
Final Cuts Interim 
Omissions 
Final 
Omissions 
KW test 
Total Assets t-1 Mean    ($M) 2135.97 1990.71 307.45 352.08  
 Median ($M) 100.61 134.35 73.01 78.56 7.53* 
NPAT /TA t-1 Mean % 7.81 8.24 0.60 6.79  
 Median% 6.39 6.47 3.41 5.33 19.82*** 
NPAT /TA t Mean % 3.22 5.35 -8.15 -7.49  
 Median% 4.28 4.67 -1.88 -1.17 72.61*** 
NOCF/TA t-1 Mean % 8.02 8.53 6.86 5.76  
 Median% 7.64 8.04 5.07 6.76 4.02 
NOCF/TA t Mean % 6.53 7.50 4.64 4.27  
 Median% 6.67 6.25 3.83 4.24 8.45** 
∆NPAT/TA Mean % -4.59 -2.89 -8.74 -14.28  
 Median% -2.52 -1.60 -4.36 -7.27 26.46*** 
∆NOCF/TA Mean % -1.49 -1.04 -2.21 -1.48  
 Median% -0.68 -1.47 -1.74 -1.38 0.26 
MV Mean  ($M) 1037.02 1402.96 149.66 157.35  
 Median 85.6 124.3 30.04 37.80 23.67*** 
BM t-1 Mean 0.89 0.82 0.96 1.00  
 Median 0.93 0.82 0.95 0.99 13.64*** 
Idiosyncratic risk  Mean % 2.38 2.16 3.26 3.24  
 Median % 2.15 1.87 3.03 2.80 43.27*** 
Sample Size  75 110 50 34  
*Significantly different from zero at 10% level, ** significantly different from zero at 5% level and *** significantly different from zero at 
1% level. 
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Table 3: Price Reaction to Dividend reductions 
This table reports mean and median abnormal returns and the standard residual t-tests (SRT) employing the market model 
for dividend reduction for the periods: the day before the announcement date to day after (day-1 to day +1); the day of the 
announcement date to day after the announcement date (day 0 to day +1) and the two day before the announcement day to 
two days after the announcement date (day-2 to day+2). Panel A reports price reaction to all dividend reductions, interim 
dividend reductions and final dividend reductions. Panel B reports price reaction to interim cuts, interim omissions, final cuts 
and final omissions. This table also provides parametric t-test statistics for the difference in mean abnormal returns between 
two sub groups: interim reductions and final reductions, and anova test statistics for the difference in mean abnormal returns 
across the four sub groups: interim cuts, final cuts, interim omissions and final omissions.  *Significantly different from zero 
at the 10% level, ** significantly different from zero at the 5% level and *** significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level. 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Price reaction:  interim dividend reductions versus final dividend reductions 
  All  Interim 
Reductions 
Final 
Reductions 
t-test  
Mean (%) -3.14 -4.35 -2.08 2.39** 
Median (%) -1.37 -1.71 -1.08  
 
Day -1 to 
day +1 SRT    (-20.84)***     (-19.43)***    (-10.38)***  
Mean (%) -2.76 -4.09 -1.59 2.60*** 
Median (%) -0.86 -1.35 -0.49  
 
Day 0 to 
day +1 SRT     (-17.80)***    (-18.35)***      (-7.23)***  
Mean (%) -3.36 -4.75 -2.15 2.41** 
Median (%) -1.33 -1.64 -0.82  
 
Day -2 to 
day +2 SRT     (-22.58)***     (-20.66)***     (-11.62)***  
Sample Size 269 125 144  
Panel B: Price reaction to Four Way classification: Interim Cuts, Final Cuts, Interim Omissions and Final Omissions ons 
 
 
 Interim Cuts Interim 
Omissions 
Final Cuts Final 
Omissions 
Anova test 
Mean (%) -3.41 -5.77 -1.82 -2.93 3.09** 
Median (%) -1.53 -3.16 -1.10 -0.73  
 
Day -1 to 
day +1 SRT      (-14.05)***     (-13.51)***       (-9.44)***      (-4.39)***  
Mean (%) 03.21 -5.42 -1.25 -2.70 3.34** 
Median (%) -0.89 -2.80 -0.59 -0.18  
 
Day 0 to 
day +1 
 
SRT      (13.04)***    (-13.04)***      (-6.06)***       (-3.97)***  
Mean (%) -3.21 -7.05 -1.80 -3.28 4.14*** 
Median (%) -0.98 -3.96 -0.53 -1.78  
Day -2 to 
day +2 
 SRT      (-12.63)***     (-17.20)***     (-10.00)***      (-5.94)***  
Sample Size 75 50 110 34  
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Table 4: Analysis of Price Reaction  
Table 4 provides cross-sectional results for the dividend reductions firms.  The dependent variable is three-day abnormal returns, employing the market model.  Independent 
variables are the percentage dividend reduction (Dred), pre-announcement abnormal returns from day -60 to day -2 (PRECAR), the natural logarithm of the market value 
(LMV), book to market ratio (BM), gearing ratio (equity to total assets) at the balance sheet date immediately prior to the dividend reduction announcement  and dummy 
variables DIOF.  DIOF equals 1 if the firm reduces its dividend at the interim stage and zero if the firm reduces the dividend at the final stage. *Significantly different from 
zero at the 10% level, ** significantly different from zero at the 5% level and *** significantly different from zero at the 1% level.. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
C 
-0.0113 
      (-1.95)* 
-0.0059 
   (-0.84) 
-0.0064 
    (-0.95) 
0.0061 
  (0.29) 
0.0154 
    (0.70) 
-0.0022 
   (-0.20) 
0.0256 
   (0.87) 
DRED 
-0.0360 
        (-2.53)** 
-0.0308 
       (-2.35)** 
-0.0271 
       (-2.20)** 
-0.0315 
    (-1.99)* 
-0.0310 
     (-1.94)* 
-0.0263 
         (-2.03)** 
-0.0315 
    (-1.95)* 
DIOF  
-0.0178 
      (-1.97)* 
-0.0194 
      (-2.09)** 
-0.0200 
      (-2.10)** 
-0.0198 
        (-2.10)** 
 -0.0193 
         (-2.09)** 
-0.0198 
        (-2.09)** 
PRECAR     
-0.0778 
       (-2.27)** 
-0.0801 
      (-2.30)** 
-0.0797 
       (-2.30)** 
  -0.0773 
         (-2.26)** 
-0.0811 
         (-2.33)** 
BMt-1     
-0.0086 
    (-0.73) 
  -0.0052 
     ( -0.42) 
-0.0073 
     (-0.58) 
LMV    
-0.0022 
    (-0.73) 
-0.0026 
   (-0.90)  
-0.0027 
    (-0.92) 
Gearing ratiot-1       
-0.0200 
    (-0.72) 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0216 0.0304 0.0626 0.0615 0.0593 0.0596 0.0583 
F-statistics 6.92 5.20 6.96 5.39 4.38 5.25 3.76 
P-value 0.0090 0.0061 0.0002 0.0003 0.0008 0.0004 0.0013 
Sample size 269 269 269 269 
 
269 269 269 
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Table 5: Determinants of dividend reductions 
This table provides Tobit regression results. The dependent variable is DRED: percentage of dividend reduction; Independent variables are IDYRISK: the idiosyncratic risk measured as the 
standard error of the market model regression of daily stock returns over the period from day –260 to day –61 for each dividend reduction announcement;; LMV: the logarithm of the market 
value of the issuing firm; NPAT/TAt-1 :net profit after tax to total assets at one year before the dividend reduction announcement date; ∆NPAT/TA:  changes in net profit after tax to total 
assets, BM: book to market ratio.  Panel A reports the full sample results.  Panel B the results for interim dividend reductions. Panel C the results for final dividend reductions. 
 
 Panel A: Full Sample Panel B: Interim Dividend Reductions Panel C: Final dividend Reductions 
 
Constant 
 
NPAT/TAt-1 
 
∆NPAT/ TA 
 
Idiosyncratic Risk 
 
LMV 
 
BM 
 
 
Adjusted R-Squared 
Log likelihood ratio 
N 
 
0.5919 
(6.36)*** 
-0.8608 
(-3.99)*** 
-0.5526 
(-3.21)*** 
6.9881 
(5.49)*** 
-0.0389 
(-4.06)*** 
-0.0134 
(-0.22) 
 
0.2986 
-44.26 
269 
 
0.5771 
(8.50)*** 
-0.8489 
(-4.25)*** 
-0.5544 
(-3.22)*** 
6.9515 
(5.50)*** 
-0.0384 
(-4.15)*** 
 
 
 
0.3011 
-44.29 
269 
 
0.3107 
(6.81)*** 
 
 
 
 
9.6258 
(5.76) *** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1736 
-68.44 
269 
 
0.6032 
(4.45) *** 
-0.8481 
(-3.68) *** 
-0.6013 
(-3.06) *** 
5.3134 
(3.89) *** 
-0.0299 
(-1.86)* 
0.0137 
(0.16) 
 
0.2179 
-24.42 
125 
 
0.6158 
(5.90) *** 
-0.8522 
(-3.71) *** 
-0.6000 
(-3.05) *** 
5.3823 
(3.01) *** 
-0.0303 
(-1.95)* 
 
 
 
0.2243 
-24.44 
125 
 
0.4130 
(6.92)*** 
 
 
 
 
8.0187 
(4.26) *** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1190 
-34.40 
125 
 
0.6034 
(5.08) *** 
-1.2133 
(-2.92) *** 
-0.4386 
(-2.19)** 
9.6035 
(5.18)*** 
-0.04324 
(-3.84)*** 
-0.0693 
(-0.85) 
 
0.3293 
-15.43 
144 
 
0.5225 
(5.74)*** 
-1.0415 
(-3.18)*** 
-0.4590 
(-2.26)** 
9.1493 
(5.22)*** 
-0.0398 
(-3.46)*** 
 
 
 
0.3293 
-15.43 
144 
 
0.2383 
(3.41)*** 
 
 
 
 
10.4854 
(3.67)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.2023 
-28.92 
144 
Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** significantly different from zero at the 5% level, and ***significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
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Table 6: Decision to reduce dividend at the interim rather than at final stage 
 
This table provides probit regression results. The dependent variable is the dummy variable DIOF where reduction in interim dividend is equal to one and zero otherwise. Independent variables are  
LMVt-1: the logarithm of the market value of the issuing firm at the balance sheet date immediate before the financial year of the dividend reduction; BMt-1: book to market ratio  at the balance sheet 
date immediately before the financial year of the dividend reduction;  and NPAT/TAt-1 is the net profit after tax to total assets at the balance sheet date immediate before the financial year of the 
dividend reduction. 
 1 2 
 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
Constant 
 
NPAT/TAt-1 
 
NPAT/TAt 
 
∆NPAT/ TA 
 
LMVt-1 
 
BMt-1 
 
McFadden R-squared  
LR statistic 
Probability (LR stat) 
N 
0.0459 
(0.49) 
-2.02 
(-2.37)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0152 
5.65 
0.0174 
269 
-0.0838 
(-1.09) 
 
 
-0.8600 
(-1.22) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0091 
3.38 
0.0662 
269 
-0.0965 
(-1.19) 
 
 
 
 
-0.1339 
(-0.30) 
 
 
 
 
0.0002 
0.10 
0.76 
269 
0.3199 
(1.61) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0896 
(-2.23)** 
 
 
0.0137 
5.10 
0.0240 
269 
-0.3291 
(-1.54) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.2695 
(1.19) 
0.0045 
1.66 
0.1971 
269 
0.4895 
(1.30) 
-2.4000 
(-2.49)** 
 
 
-0.5579 
(-0.84) 
-0.0864 
(-1.96)** 
-0.0646 
(-0.27) 
0.0320 
11.88 
0.0183 
269 
0.0315 
(0.34) 
-2.4243 
(-2.62)*** 
 
 
-0.6710 
 (-1.03) 
 
 
 
 
0.0205 
7.61 
0.0223 
269 
0.4049 
(1.95) 
-2.2990 
(-2.48)** 
 
 
-0.5685 
(-0.86) 
-0.0822 
(-2.03)** 
 
 
0.0318 
11.81 
0.0081 
269 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** significantly different from zero at the 5% level, and ***significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
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